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Abstract
The Great Moderation is often characterized by the decline in the variability of
output and inﬂation from earlier periods. While a multitude of explanations for
the Great Moderation exist, notable research has focused on the role of mon-
etary policy. Speciﬁcally, early evidence suggested that the increased stability
has been associated with monetary policy that responded much more strongly to
rising inﬂation. Recent evidence casts doubt on this change in monetary policy.
An alternative hypothesis is that the change in monetary policy was the result
of a change in doctrine; speciﬁcally the rejection of the view that inﬂation was
largely a cost-push phenomenon. As a result, this alternative hypothesis sug-
gests that the change in monetary policy beginning in 1979 is reﬂected in the
Federal Reserve’s response to movements in nominal income rather than inﬂa-
tion as previously argued. I provide evidence for this hypothesis by estimating
the parameters of a monetary policy rule in which policy adjusts to forecasts of
nominal GDP for the pre- and post-Volcker eras. Finally, I embed the rule in
two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with gradual price adjust-
ment to determine whether the overhaul of doctrine can explain the reduction in
the volatility of inﬂation and the output gap.
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Over the period beginning around 1984 through much of 2007, there was a substantial decline
in macroeconomic volatility. Speciﬁcally, Blanchard and Simon (2001) have shown that the
standard deviation of quarterly output growth declined by half and that of inﬂation declined
by two-thirds over this period.2 Given this increased stability, this time period has been
characterized as ”The Great Moderation.”
There are three general explanations for the Great Moderation. The ﬁrst view is that
the moderation of economic ﬂuctuations is the result of inventory dynamics (McCarthy and
Rakrajsek, 2007).3 An alternate view presented by Stock and Watson (2003) is that the
increased stability is the result of smaller macroeconomic shocks. Finally, others such as
Taylor (1999), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), and Bernanke (2004) have attributed this
decline in the United States to a signiﬁcant change in monetary policy. Speciﬁcally, these
authors argue that monetary policy after the appointment of Paul Volcker to the Federal
Reserve is characterized by an increased responsiveness of monetary policy to inﬂation. A
series of work by Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2003c, 2004) casts doubt on these results.
In reality, an explanation of the Great Moderation likely requires some degree of each
hypothesis. Nevertheless, if any part of the decline in volatility can be attributed to monetary
policy, it is important to understand precisely the change in policy to ensure that past
mistakes are not repeated. The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative perspective
to the earlier work on monetary policy and the Great Moderation that views the changes
in policy as the result an overhaul of Federal Reserve doctrine rather than as a change in
the parameters of the Taylor rule. Speciﬁcally, this paper provides empirical support for a
view put forth by Nelson (2005), Hetzel (2008a, 2008b), and Dicecio and Nelson (2009) that
the change in monetary policy beginning with Paul Volcker represented an overhaul of the
previous doctrine that largely viewed inﬂation as a cost-push phenomenon.
2This change was also noted earlier by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Kim and Nelson (1999).
3The authors acknowledge that changes in monetary policy are likely to have played a signiﬁcant role as
well.
1The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents two views of monetary policy that can
potentially explain the Great Moderation. The ﬁrst view emphasizes the increased emphasis
of the Federal Reserve to the inﬂation rate. The second view emphasizes an overhaul of
the doctrine within the Federal Reserve in which the central bank changed its beliefs about
the underlying causes of inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, this overhaul can be reﬂected in the Federal
Reserve’s responsiveness to its forecast of nominal income growth rather than that of the
inﬂation rate. Section 3 provides empirical support to the alternative hypothesis. Section 4
examines the macroeconomic implications of the shift in policy and section 5 concludes.
2 Two Stories of Macroeconomic Stability
2.1 Monetary Policy and the Great Moderation
Evaluation of monetary policy and the Great Moderation often begin with a description of the
Taylor curve, shown in Figure 1. The Taylor curve is an eﬃciency locus for monetary policy
that describes the trade-oﬀ between the variability of inﬂation and the variability of output.4
Assuming that monetary policy is optimal, the Taylor curve suggests that policymakers can
only cause movements along the curve. By contrast, shifts in the curve result from structural
changes in the economy. Thus, for monetary policy to explain the Great Moderation, it must
be true that monetary policy was not optimal (operating beyond the Taylor curve, as shown
by point A). It follows that in order to explain a potential role for monetary policy in the
Great Moderation, one must be able to show a sizable shift in policy.
Historical analysis of monetary policy has provided some evidence for the conjecture that
policy was not optimal. Following Taylor (1993), this research has emphasized a monetary
policy rule in which the Federal Reserve adjusts the federal funds rate in response to inﬂation
and economic activity commonly known as the Taylor rule. The adoption of the framework
has been aided by ability of this rule to capture the historical behavior of monetary policy
4For a discussion of the Taylor curve, see Taylor (1998). Examples of analyses of the Great Moderation
that focus on the Taylor curve, see Stock and Watson (2003) and Bernanke (2004).
2quite well (Taylor, 1993; Orphanides, 2003a). In addition, such analysis generally identiﬁes
the shift in policy that could potentially explain the Great Moderation coincides with the
appointment of Paul Volcker to the Federal Reserve in October 1979 as a result of the
signiﬁcant and lasting reduction in inﬂation since the start of his tenure.
Taylor (1999) conducts an historical analysis for the era of the international gold standard
and the period after World War II. His analysis aims to measure the particular response of
the federal funds rate characterized by the Taylor rule:
Rt = ¯ rt + πt + φπ(πt − π
∗
t) + φy˜ y + et
where ¯ r is the real rate of interest, π is the inﬂation rate, π∗ is the target rate of inﬂation,
and ˜ y is the output gap. The coeﬃcient estimates given by Taylor for this model are shown
in Table 1.
Taylor’s coeﬃcient estimates show a clear shift in policy between the pre-1979 era and
the era in which Alan Greenspan oversaw the Federal Reserve. For the period prior to 1979,
the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is nearly half and that on output is one-third of those estimated
for the Greenspan era. What’s more, the latter results are also consistent with the normative
suggestions given by Taylor (1993).
Particularly important to Taylor’s analysis is the fact that the response of the federal
funds rate to inﬂation in the pre-1979 period is less than unity. As Taylor emphasizes, this
tepid response to rising inﬂation implies that when the inﬂation rate rises, the real interest
rate declines. The decline in the real interest rate stimulates aggregate demand and stokes
further inﬂationary pressures. This type of policy leads to instability as inﬂation is able to
increase without bound. By contrast, if the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is greater than unity, an
increase in inﬂation will result in an increase in the real interest rate and would generate
stability. Thus, the shift in policy from the Great Inﬂation of the late 1960s and 1970s to that
of the Great Moderation is a more aggressive response to inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, monetary
policy in the latter period is one in which the real interest rate increases in response to rising
inﬂation.
3A similar analysis to that of Taylor is undertaken by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).
This latter analysis, however, diﬀers in two important respects. First, one common criti-
cism of the Taylor rule is that policy decisions require access to contemporaneous data.5 As
emphasized in McCallum and Nelson (1999a: 18), rules that require knowledge of contempo-
raneous data are non-operational because ”there is uncertainty regarding the realized value
of real GDP even at the end of the quarter in actual economies.” To overcome this problem,
Clarida, et. al posit a forward-looking rule in which the central bank responds to deviations
of expected inﬂation and output from their respective targets. The second diﬀerence from
the earlier analysis stems from the fact that the basic Taylor rule seems much too crude to
fully capture the actual behavior of the federal funds rates in that it ignores the Federal
Reserve’s tendency to smooth interest rates over time.6 Thus, while the long run behavior
of the central bank can be considered to be consistent with the Taylor rule, the behavior of
the federal funds rate can be characterized as follows:
Rt = ρRt−1 + (1 − ρ)[¯ rt + πt + φπ(πt − π
∗
t) + φy˜ y] + ηt
where monetary policy gradually moves toward its long run target.
As shown in Table 1, the estimation results corresponding to this model highlight a
clear shift in monetary policy after 1979. Consistent with the results given by Taylor, the
magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output gap each increased in the
post-Volcker era. Speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is two-and-a-half times larger and
the coeﬃcient on the output gap is over three times as large as the corresponding estimates
from the earlier period. What’s more, the response of the Federal Reserve to inﬂation in the
pre-Volcker era is again insuﬃcient to increase the real interest rate.
The diﬀerences in policy have important implications for macroeconomic dynamics as
the authors ﬁnd that when using the monetary policy rule outlined above in a standard New
Keynesian model, the estimated rule from the earlier period results in an indeterminacy
5It should be noted that the original Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) related the interest rate instrument with
lagged values of inﬂation and the output gap.
6For a discussion of theoretical justiﬁcations for interest rate smoothing see Sack and Wieland (2000).
4Table 1: Estimated Taylor Rules
Coeﬃcient on:
π ˜ y Rt−1
Taylor
1960 - 1979 0.81 0.25
1987 - 1997 1.53 0.77
Clarida, Gali, Gertler
1960 - 1979 0.83 0.27 0.68
1979 - 1996 2.15 0.93 0.79
Orphanides
1966 - 1979 1.49 0.46 0.68
1979 - 1995 1.89 0.18 0.77
Clarida, Gali and Gertler as well as Orphanides estimate the Taylor rule
with an autoregressive component, ρ, to capture interest rate smoothing
evident in policy.
of equilibrium. They argue that the indeterminacy results from the insuﬃcient response
of the central bank to higher rates of inﬂation. In this case, shocks that are not related
to economic fundamentals can cause increases in prices. In other words, the existence of
multiple equilibria is the result of the potential for self-fulﬁlling expectations. When coupled
with the weak response of monetary policy to changes in inﬂation, large shocks can have a
signiﬁcant impact on the the volatility of output and prices.7
Finally, Clarida, et. al show that the volatility of inﬂation and output varies inversely
with the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on inﬂation. In fact, when the coeﬃcient on inﬂation
rises from one to two, the volatility of inﬂation and output decline by more than half. This
provides further evidence that the shift in policy beginning in 1979 can indeed explain the
sizable declines in volatility experienced during the Great Moderation.
A recent series of research by Orphanides (2001, 2002, 2003c, 2004), however, calls into
question the shift in how monetary policy responds to inﬂation. Orphanides (2002) shows
that, when using data available to policymakers in real-time, monetary policy during the
7Note that indeterminacy is diﬀerent than the instability argument put forth by Taylor. In this case, the
equilibria are stable.
51970s was characterized by a rule that is consistent with the estimated rules for the period
after 1979. The distinction between using ex post data and data that is available in real-
time is important because there is often considerable noise in variables in real-time. What’s
more, macroeconomic aggregates often undergo signiﬁcant revisions in the aftermath of their
release. In order to capture the actual intent of the policy, one must rely upon data or
forecasts that were available at the time the decision was made.
In a more comprehensive analysis, Orphanides (2004) estimates the Taylor rule given
in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) for the periods 1966 - 1979 and 1979 - 1995 using the
Greenbook forecasts from the Federal Reserve. The results are shown in Table 1.8 These
results show two clear diﬀerences between those of Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000). First, the response parameter to inﬂation is greater than unity in each time
period. These results cast serious doubts on the explanations of both an unstable equilibrium
and the existence of sunspot equilibria highlighted in the earlier work. Second, for the period
after 1979, the response parameter to the output gap is noticeably smaller when estimated
using real-time data. Thus, while the results of Taylor and Clarida, et. al suggest that the
Federal Reserve became more activist toward the output gap, Orphanides’s results imply a
more tepid response.
Overall, the results of Orphanides (2004) demonstrate a policy that seems quite consistent
over each period. In fact, the one exception is the decline in the response to the output gap.
This would seem to imply that any success of post-1979 policy is due to the decline in the
response to the output gap from the earlier period. Again, this runs counter to hypothesis
that the success of the Federal Reserve was due to the increased responsiveness to inﬂation.
2.2 An Alternative Perspective
The view held by Taylor and Clarida, et. al is broadly deﬁned as one in which the Federal
Reserve did not have a strong enough response to inﬂation. There are a wide variety of
8Orphanides estimates these rules over various forecast time horizons. The results are robust to the
alternative speciﬁcations.
6reasons why this might be the case. For example, DeLong (1997) argues that the Fed’s
stronger commitment was reduce unemployment. Clarida, et. al argue that Federal Reserve
served to accommodate higher inﬂation expectations. Similarly, Christiano and Gust (2000)
argue that the central bank simply responded to non-monetary shocks with expansionary
policy. Finally, Taylor (1992) suggests that the Fed underestimated the costs of inﬂation.
There are substantial reasons to doubt each of these hypotheses. For example, the work
of Barsky and Killian (2001) suggests that the monetary policy expansion started before the
non-monetary events and that rising commodity prices were the result, not the cause, of
policy easing. This would seem to cast doubt on the views put forth by Clarida et. al and
Christiano and Gust. What’s more, the view that inﬂation was somehow of lesser concern to
the Federal Reserve during the late 1960s and 1970s is similarly not supported by the views
of the policymakers themselves. For example, Hetzel (1998: 21) notes that Arthur Burns,
Federal Reserve chairman throughout much of the 1970s, ”was ﬁercely opposed to inﬂation.”
In addition, the views of Taylor (1992) and DeLong (1997) require that the Fed had a belief in
a permanent trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment. In other words, this view implies
that the Federal Reserve deliberately created inﬂation to lower unemployment. However, in a
variety of public statements Arthur Burns explicitly rejected this notion (Dicecio and Nelson,
2009). Statements by others within the Federal Reserve at the time also conﬁrmed the view
that the long run Phillips curve was vertical (Meltzer, 2010). When taken together with
the work of Orphanides discussed above, it would seem that the change in Federal Reserve
policy was not summarized by an adjustment of the weights on inﬂation and unemployment
(or the output gap) in a Taylor-type rule.
An alternative view of the change in monetary policy from the Great Inﬂation to the
Great Moderation is that there was an overhaul of Federal Reserve doctrine. Beginning in
the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the emerging view was that inﬂation was a cost-
push, and therefore non-monetary, phenomenon. This was increasingly reﬂected in views
expressed in newspaper columns, statements by politicians, and most importantly within the
Federal Reserve (Nelson, 2005). Hetzel (2008b: 161) notes that the ”Keynesian orthodoxy
7held that the optimal combination of ﬁscal and monetary policy could deliver sustained real
growth and high output while incomes policies could limit the resulting inﬂation.”9 As early
as 1970, Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Burns argued that ”monetary and ﬁscal tools are
inadequate for dealing with sources of price inﬂation such as are plaguing us now – that is,
pressure on the costs arising from excessive wage increases” (quoted in Nelson, 2005: 17).
What’s more, Meltzer (2009: 15) argues that Burns often ”blamed inﬂation on labor unions,
monopolies, and the welfare state.” Each of which could be interpreted as cost-push shocks.
Further, as Nelson (2005) points out, Burns routinely denied any role of the Federal Reserve
in generating inﬂation and repeatedly argued against a tighter monetary policy.
The idea that the Fed was using an incorrect doctrine was recognized early by Friedman
(1972: 13) who noted that the ”failure of monetary policy ...has scientiﬁc interest because
the erratic and destabilizing monetary policy has largely resulted from acceptance of erro-
neous economic theories.” He concluded that ”monetary policy did not fail in the past three
years in the relevant scientiﬁc sense. The drugs produced the eﬀect to be expected though
the wrong drug was administered” (ibid: 17). Friedman’s statements were motivated by
then-recent remarks by Arthur Burns that ”the rules of economics are not working in quite
the way they used to” (ibid: 11) with regards to inﬂation.
When viewed in an aggregate demand (AD)-aggregate supply (AS) framework, the cost-
push view coupled with the persistently overestimated negative output gaps shown by Or-
phanides (2004) suggest that the Federal Reserve erroneously interpreted positive AD shocks
as negative AS shocks. What’s more, given the belief within the Federal Reserve that its
ability to correct inﬂationary forces was limited, the central bank would likely respond to
these misinterpreted shocks with either a tepid response or, worse yet, expansionary policy
while advocating wage and price controls. In point of fact, the latter was precisely the policy
advocated by Arthur Burns and later the Nixon administration (Hetzel, 1998). This view
was similarly supported by Burn’s replacement G. William Miller in 1978 (Nelson, 2005;
9The term ”incomes policy” refers to some type of wage and price controls. For a sample of the ”Keynesian
orthodoxy” see Samuelson and Solow (1960).
8Dicecio and Nelson, 2009).
An expansionary monetary policy (an increase in AD) could be rationalized by those
who favored the cost-push view because they denied ”that upward shifts of output toward
potential were a source of inﬂationary pressure” (Nelson, 2004: 20; emphasis in the original).
This view is illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the typical AD-AS graph with the notable
diﬀerence being the shape of the short-run aggregate supply (SAS) curve. The cost-push
view, as advocated by policymakers in the 1970s, suggests that the SAS curve is horizontal
when output is below potential. The implication of this characteristic is that cost-push shocks
could drive prices higher and output lower. Meanwhile, monetary policy could successfully
increase AD without generating inﬂationary pressures. On the contrary, under this view,
”a markedly more restrictive policy would have led to a still sharper rise in interest rates
and risked a premature ending of the business expansion, without limiting to any signiﬁcant
degree this years upsurge of the price level” (Burns, 1973: 21). The eﬀect of expansionary
policy under this framework is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2.
This view can also explain why there are observed diﬀerences in the estimates of the
parameter on inﬂation in the Taylor rule from the Great Inﬂation to the Great Moderation.
Under the cost-push doctrine, a forecast based on the Phillips curve would result in systemat-
ically lower predicted values of inﬂation. This is precisely the empirically reality observed by
Orphanides (2002). What’s more, the fact that inﬂation was systematically under-forecast
implies that estimates of the Federal Reserve’s reaction function, as measured by the Taylor
rule, would imply that the central bank had a much stronger responsiveness to inﬂation
when measured by the forecast rather than its ex post value.10
This viewpoint changed with the appointment of Paul Volcker to Federal Reserve chair-
man. Following his appointment as Fed chairman, Volcker elevated inﬂation reduction as
the top priority of the FOMC, speciﬁcally through an emphasis on inﬂation expectations
(Hetzel, 2008a; Meltzer, 2009, 2010). As Hetzel (2008a: 150) notes, ”Volcker challenged
10Meltzer (2009) notes that both Volcker and Greenspan had little use for the Federal Reserve staﬀ forecasts
of inﬂation based on the Phillips curve.
9Keynesian orthodoxy, which held that the ’high’ unemployment of the 1970s demonstrated
that inﬂation arose from cost-push and supply shocks.” In direct contrast to policies dur-
ing the Great Inﬂation, Volcker argued that the policy adopted by the FOMC ”rests on a
simple premise – one documented by centuries of experience – that the inﬂationary process
is ultimately related to excessive growth in money and credit” (quoted in Hetzel, 2008a:
151). This view implicitly accepts that rising inﬂation is caused by demand-pull, or excess
aggregate demand.
The distinction between the interpretation of the shocks is particularly important for
understanding the potential change in monetary policy from an overhaul of doctrine. An
AD shock is associated with rising output and increasing prices. This implies that AD
shocks are associated with increases in nominal income growth. By contrast, AS shocks are
characterized by opposite movements in prices and output and should therefore result in a
negligible impact on nominal income growth. As a result, misperceptions about the nature
of the shock can lead to persistent increases in AD and therefore rising rates of nominal
income growth. A recognition that rising inﬂation is the result of increases in AD, however,
would result in corresponding reductions in AD induced by monetary policy. It follows that
an alternative assessment of the change of monetary policy from the pre- to post-Volcker era
is to determine its role in stabilizing nominal income growth. An increased responsiveness
of monetary policy to nominal income growth would therefore provide empirical support for
the overhaul of doctrine hypothesis.
3 Empirical Evidence
A cursory examination of the period labeled the Great Moderation demonstrates that the
period is not only one of moderation in the volatility of real output and inﬂation, but also of
nominal spending. The behavior of the growth of nominal spending over the last 50 years in
the United States is shown in Figure 3. The time period classiﬁed as the Great Moderation is
characterized by stability in the growth rate of nominal spending. By contrast, the period of
10the late 1960s and 1970s demonstrates a clear upward trend in nominal spending, reﬂecting
the signiﬁcant increases in the inﬂation rate and, potentially, the persistent increases in AD
as a result of misperceptions about the nature of the shock.
One way to test the hypothesis is through the use of a historical analysis of monetary
policy based on a nominal spending target rule analogous to the aforementioned research
on the Taylor rule. The hypothesis that monetary policy has become more responsive to




t = α + βEt−1∆xt (1)
where R∗
t is the long run target of the federal funds rate, Et−1∆xt is the forecast of nominal
spending for period t at the beginning of the period. Thus, while it was clearly not an
explicit goal of the Federal Reserve to stabilize nominal spending, this empirical analysis
examines whether the responsiveness of monetary policy to nominal income growth changed
as implied by the overhaul of doctrine.
Nevertheless, even if the monetary policy rule outlined in equation (1) is consistent with
how the target of the federal funds rate is determined, it is unlikely to capture the actual
behavior of the federal funds rate itself over the time period in question. As previously
mentioned, the Federal Reserve tends to smooth the interest rate. As a result, the federal
funds rate is modeled to be consistent with Clarida, et. al:
Rt = ρRt−1 + (1 − ρ)R
∗
t + εt (2)
where Rt is the actual federal funds rate and R∗
t is the long run response of the federal funds
rate as modeled in equation (1). The actual behavior of the federal funds rate is therefore
11Formally, this rule could be expressed as follows: Rt = ¯ R+β(∆xt−∆x∗) where ¯ R is the desired nominal
interest rate and ∆x∗ is the nominal income growth target. It follows that the constant term is given by
α = ¯ R − β∆x∗.
11Table 2: Smoothing Rule Results
Time Period ˜ α ˜ β ρ
1966:I - 1979:III 0.18 (0.77) 0.11 (0.04) 0.86 (0.10)
1979:IV - 2003:IV -0.67 (0.42) 0.41 (0.14) 0.77 (0.09)
1966:I - 2003:IV -0.49 (0.30) 0.17 (0.05) 0.91 (0.03)
This corresponds to the rule Rt = ρRt−1 + ˜ α + ˜ β∆xt + εt where ˜ α = (1 − ρ)α and ˜ β = (1 − ρ)β
captured by substituting equation (1) into equation (2) such that:12
Rt = ρRt−1 + (1 − ρ)(α + βEt−1∆xt) + εt (3)
In order to examine the responsiveness of the Federal Reserve to nominal spending, I estimate
equation (3) for the pre- and post-Volcker eras. Expected nominal GDP growth is given by
the quarter-to-quarter Greenbook forecast expressed in annual rates thereby assuring that
the rule is estimated with data available to the FOMC at the time policy was made. The
results are shown in Table 2.
Before discussing the results, a note about the estimation seems prudent. When the
model is estimated using least squares, there is some evidence of serial correlation in the
error term. In order to accurately evaluate and examine the robustness of the results, two
techniques are used. In the ﬁrst method, the parameters are estimated using least squares
and evaluated for signiﬁcance using Newey-West standard errors that are robust to serial
correlation. The second method uses a vector of instruments to estimate the parameters
using Generalized Method of Moments with a spectral density matrix that accounts for serial
correlation. Each of the techniques produced similar results. The least squares estimates are
given in the corresponding table with the Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.
As shown in Table 2, there is a sizable diﬀerence in the response of both the federal
funds rate and the implied long run response of the federal funds rate to a change in nominal
GDP. Forecasts of nominal GDP have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the actual federal
12A similar equation is estimated by McCallum and Nelson (1999b) for the period 1979 - 1997. However,
their estimates are calculated using ex post data and thus succumb to the same criticism outlined above.
12funds rate in both the pre- and post-Volcker era. However, this eﬀect is 4 times smaller in
the pre-Volcker era than that of the post-1979. In addition, the estimates suggest that the
long-run response of the federal funds rate for each period is given by the following:13
R
∗
t = .79∆xt (4)
R
∗
t = 1.78∆xt (5)
where equations (4) and (5) represent the pre- and post-Volcker eras, respectively. These
results bear some similarity to those of Taylor and Clarida, et. al regarding the Federal
Reserve’s response to nominal variables. In this earlier work, a coeﬃcient on inﬂation less
than unity implies that that the real interest rate falls when inﬂation rises creating the
potential for instability or sunspot equilibria. By contrast, this model suggests an eerily
similar increased responsiveness to nominal income. Given that the results of this earlier
work are not robust to estimation using real-time data, the results presented here suggest
that policy was indeed much more tepid to a nominal variable in the pre-Volcker era, albeit
one diﬀerent than previously suggested. The macroeconomic implications of the policy shift
are considered below.
4 Nominal Income Responsiveness and Volatility
Despite empirical evidence that the response of the federal funds rate to the Greenbook fore-
cast of nominal income was stronger in the post-Volcker era than in the preceding period,
it does not oﬀer any conclusions regarding volatility. In an attempt to examine macroeco-
nomic implications, I embed the rule in two DSGE models and compare the implications
under the alternative parameter estimates for each period. The ﬁrst model is the standard
New Keynesian model with Calvo price adjustment.14 The second model is the semi-classical
P-bar model, in which prices are ﬁxed at the beginning of each period and the natural rate
13The variables included in the target are only those in which the corresponding parameters are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in estimation.
14For a textbook treatment, see Gali (2008) or Woodford (2003).
13hypothesis is satisﬁed.15 The choice of these models is motivated by their ability to capture
the empirical properties of the business cycle reasonably well. Two models are employed to
examine the robustness of the results to diﬀerent structural speciﬁcations.
4.1 Framework for Analysis







yt = Etyt+1 −
1
σ
(rt − Etπt+1) + e
IS
t (7)
˜ yt = yt − y
n
t (8)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ˜ yt (9)




t is the natural rate of output, at is a technology shock, yt is real output, ˜ yt is the
output gap, and πt is the inﬂation rate.
The equilibrium of the P-bar model is given by the following log-linear equations:
˜ yt = Et˜ yt+1 − b(rt − Etπt+1) + e
IS
t (11)
Et−1˜ yt = φ˜ yt−1 (12)
˜ yt = yt − ¯ yt (13)
¯ yt = ρy¯ yt−1 + e
y
t (14)
where ¯ y is the natural rate of output.
Here, equations (7) and (11) are dynamic, forward-looking IS equations. Equations (8)
and (13) deﬁne the output gap. Equation (6) deﬁnes the natural rate of output. In the P-bar
model, the natural rate is assumed to follow an AR(1) process as shown in (14). Equations
15For a discussion of this model, see McCallum and Nelson (1999a) and McCallum (2008). As is pointed out
in McCallum (2008), the natural rate hypothesis is not satisﬁed in other models of gradual price adjustment.
14(9) and (12) capture the price adjustment process in each model, with the former being the
New Keynesian Phillips curve.16
Monetary policy is conducted using the following interest rate rule, expressed in log-
deviations:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1 − ρr)β∆xt + e
r
t
where (1−ρr)β corresponds to the estimates of ˜ β above. Together with an identity for nom-
inal income, these equations are suﬃcient to solve for the equilibrium for the corresponding
model.
4.2 Simulation Results
The model is calibrated using standard values in the literature. The discount factor, β, is
set equal to 0.99. Consistent with Gali (2008) and McCallum (2008), 1
σ = b = 1. Following
McCallum, the autoregressive parameter in equation (12) is set to 0.89. Also, following Gali
(2008), the parameters φn
ya and κ are set to 1 and 0.3, respectively. The monetary policy
shock, er
t is assumed to be white noise with standard deviation of 0.002. The IS shock,
eIS
t , is also white noise with standard deviation of 0.01.17 The technology shock, e
y
t in the
P-bar model and ea
t for the New Keynesian model, has a standard deviation of 0.007 and
the autoregressive coeﬃcient on the technology shock, ρy and ρa, is 0.95. These values are
consistent with those reported in the real business cycle literature. Each model is solved
using the solution algorithm given by King and Watson (2002).
The objective of the simulations is two-fold. First, alternative rules might have diﬀerent
implications for the equilibrium of the model. In forward-looking rational expectations
models it is possible for there to exist an inﬁnite number of equilibria resulting from the
behavior of monetary policy. Although these equilibria are locally stable, they do create
16Equation (12) captures price adjustment in the sense that the minimal state variable solution allows one
to express Et−1pt = φpt−1 as Et−1˜ yt = φ˜ yt−1. See McCallum and Nelson (1999a) or McCallum (2008) for
further explanation.
17These match those estimated in McCallum and Nelson (1999a).
15the potential for economic ﬂuctuations driven by expectations that are not correlated with
economic fundamentals. Such shocks are problematic because they increase volatility and
thus, assuming agents are risk averse, reduce welfare. Second, a major characteristic of the
Great Moderation is the reduction in the volatility of inﬂation and output. Thus, these
simulations can provide insight into whether a stronger response of monetary policy to
changes in nominal income can explain the reductions in volatility. The results are discussed
in turn below.
4.2.1 Sunspots and Indeterminacy
It has become standard knowledge in the literature that the parameters of the policy are
important to the determination of equilibrium in dynamic, forward-looking rational expecta-
tions models. Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) highlight
the fact that a coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the policy rule that is less than unity causes inde-
terminacy of equilibrium. In this case sunspot shocks, or shocks that are uncorrelated with
economic fundamentals, can cause self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations in the economy. As previously
mentioned, this can be understood intuitively as resulting from the failure of the central bank
to suﬃciently respond to rising inﬂation. In this case, rising inﬂation is associated with a
decline in the real interest rate, which in turn increases aggregate demand and heightens
inﬂationary pressures.
A monetary policy rule that insuﬃciently responded to deviations of nominal income
growth from its target rate would similarly be susceptible to self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations. Under
a nominal income target, aggregate supply shocks would result in little or no response of
monetary policy as movements in prices would oﬀset, in whole or in part, movements in
output. However, ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand result in the co-movement of output
and prices. It follows that an insuﬃcient response to changes in nominal income correspond
to an insuﬃcient response to aggregate demand shocks.
Simulations of each model produce a unique equilibrium result for the rule estimated
for the post-Volcker era. However, simulations for the rule estimated for the earlier period
16Table 3: Volatility (Nominal Income Rule)
β σπ σ˜ y
New Keynesian Model 1.01 0.83 1.53
1.78 0.50 1.03
2.00 0.46 0.97
P-Par Model 1.15 3.29 11.12
1.78 1.75 4.73
2.00 1.61 4.27
produce an indeterminacy of equilibrium. Taken together with the estimates of the Taylor
rule using real time data that show that the coeﬃcient on inﬂation was greater than unity in
each period, these results would seem to suggest that it was the Federal Reserve’s failure to
suﬃciently respond to nominal income rather than inﬂation that explains the indeterminacy
result.18
4.2.2 Implications Under Alternate Rules
The ﬁnal issue to examine is whether or not an increased responsiveness to changes in
nominal income can explain the reductions in the volatility of output and inﬂation. The
standard deviations of the output gap and inﬂation for diﬀerent parameter estimates are
given in Table 3 and expressed as percentages.
The results shown in Table 3 show clear and sizable reductions the volatility of inﬂation
and the output gap as the size of the response to changes in nominal income become larger.
In the New Keynesian model a doubling of the parameter β from near unity to two results in
a decline in the volatility of the output gap of one-third and a reduction in the volatility of
inﬂation of nearly one-half. In the P-bar model, an increase in the coeﬃcient on the growth
18It is important to note that the indeterminacy results from the fact that the models employed in this
paper are forward-looking rational expectations models. If these models were backward-looking, the type of
monetary policy used in the pre-1979 period would result in instability.
17of nominal income from 1.15 to 2 leads to a decline in the volatility of output by over one-half
and a decline in the volatility of inﬂation by approximately one-half.19 For each model, when
the value of the coeﬃcient on nominal income in the long run target is less than or equal to
unity, an indeterminacy of equilibrium results thereby explaining the results of the previous
subsection.
These results give further credence to the importance of the increased responsiveness of
the Federal Reserve to nominal income growth in the period after 1979. The tepid response
to nominal income that characterized the earlier period created the potential for self-fulﬁlling
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output. What’s more, there is reason to believe that the in-
creased responsiveness in the latter period not only stabilized nominal income growth, but
also led to reductions in the volatility of inﬂation and output. Finally, these results are
robust to model speciﬁcation.
5 Conclusion
Given the reductions in the volatility of output and inﬂation during the Great Moderation,
it is important to consider whether these reductions can be attributed to policy. The work
of Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) suggests that in the period following
the appointment of Paul Volcker to the Federal Reserve was characterized by an increased
response of monetary policy to inﬂation. Recent research has cast doubt on this conclusion
by showing that when estimating a Taylor rule using real time data, the Federal Reserve’s
reaction to inﬂation during the Great Inﬂation was quite similar to that followed in the years
after Volcker’s appointment.
This paper presents an alternate view that emphasizes the overhaul of Federal Reserve
doctrine from the Great Inﬂation to the Great Moderation. Speciﬁcally, during the late
1960s and 1970s the Federal Reserve operated under the belief that inﬂation was largely
driven by cost-push forces and the parameter on the output gap in the Phillips curve was
19The value of 1.15 is chosen because volatility increases considerably as β approaches unity.
18only positive when the output gap was positive. What’s more, it was argued that this view
can be understood by examining the Federal Reserve’s responsiveness to nominal income
growth.
Empirical evidence presented in this paper supports the view that the Federal Reserve
increased its responsiveness to the growth rate of nominal spending and thus that the change
in policy was a change in Fed doctrine. Unlike the earlier research, these models are estimated
using the Greenbook forecasts of the Federal Reserve and therefore are able to capture the
actual intent of policy and are not biased by ex post data revisions. What’s more, using
estimated nominal income targeting models for the pre- and post-Volcker eras, this paper
presents evidence that the responsiveness of the Federal Reserve to changes in nominal
income growth in the earlier period was insuﬃcient to oﬀset shifts in aggregate demand
thereby resulting in a potential for self-fulﬁlling expectations. In addition, it was shown that
an increased responsiveness of monetary policy to nominal income growth can reduce the
volatility of inﬂation and output. This research therefore suggests that the Great Moderation
can be explained, at least in part, by an increased responsiveness of monetary policy to
nominal income growth and an overhaul of Federal Reserve doctrine.
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